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The Transition to Marked-Based Monetary Policy: What Can China Learn 




We discuss the prospects for Chinese money market development and transition to market-
based monetary policy operations based on a comparative historical analysis of the present 
Chinese situation and the development in 11 European countries from 1979 up to the launch 
of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Central banks in the latter group 
typically had an incentive to encourage the formation of efficient benchmark segments in the 
domestic money markets for the conduct of open market operations as traditional quantity-
oriented instruments became increasingly ineffective. China is displaying many of the same 
symptoms as the European countries in the 1970s and 1980s, including poor monetary 
transmission due to excess liquidity and conflicts of interest due to unclear priority among 
multiple policy goals. We conclude that the current Chinese multiple-target monetary policy 
is counter-productive to efforts to develop an efficient money market that can serve as arena 
for an effective market-based monetary policy. 
 
JEL classification: E42, E52, F41 
Key Words: monetary policy operations, money market, China, European Union, 
deregulation    3
1. Introduction 
The practical implementation, as well as the targets and the underlying objectives of monetary 
policy underwent significant changes in most industrial countries during a period from the late 
1970s until the late 1990s. These changes were paralleled by a transformation of financial 
markets – including money markets as the main ‘forum’ for the implementation of monetary 
policy – consisting essentially of broad-based deregulation of credit systems on the one hand, 
and a rapid growth of alternatives to central-bank money as sources of financing on the other. 
The parallel processes of financial market development and reorientation of monetary policy 
are intertwined
1 and mutually reinforcing, and have their roots in domestic political-economy 
factors as well as in increased international financial integration. Hence, history seems to 
matter for the understanding of the development of financial market structures (Forssbæck 
and Oxelheim, 2003). 
The weakness of the financial system is often argued to be an Achilles heel of the 
Chinese economy, and China is committed under its World Trade Organization (WTO) 
accession agreement to further opening up its financial system. This implies the removal of a 
large number of administrative restrictions, controls and regulations. Required reforms 
include opening up the capital account, liberalizing interest rates, and allowing foreign banks 
full access to the domestic market. There is a large (and growing) literature on the fragility of 
the Chinese banking sector, Chinese capital flows and capital flight, China’s exchange rate 
regime, etc. However, the co-dependence between financial market development –specifically 
money market development – and increased effectiveness of monetary policy in the face of 
increased international integration - through a reorientation of the targets as well as the 
arsenal of instruments used by the central bank - is a less explored area of study. Because the 
money market is a key link between a country’s financial system and its real economy, and 
the primary arena for the conduct of monetary policy, a poorly functioning money market is   4
presently a key problem in China, as the development toward a market economy in other 
sectors and commitments under the WTO accession agreement have taken the need for 
reforms of beyond the point of no return. We argue in this paper that remnants of a traditional 
‘dirigiste’, direct-control approach presently thwarts the effectiveness of monetary policy, and 
that with a more open financial system these problems are likely to persist, or even accelerate. 
We further argue that in several key respects - e.g. initial financial repression, increased 
capital mobility, poor transmission, and multiple targets with the exchange rate as the official 
one - relevant to this line of inquiry, the present situation in China is comparable to that of 
several European countries in the 1980s. Although potentially an economic giant, the size of 
the Chinese economy and its dependence on external markets during the 1990s and early 
2000s make it more comparable with small and open, rather than with larger, developed 
economies.  
The paper thus builds on research on money market development and monetary policy 
reform in a sample of small, open European countries
2 and extracts lessons for China of the 
experiences of these countries. Apart from the fact that they are small and open, the choice of 
comparison countries is motivated by the fact that the money markets for these countries’ 
currencies were virtually non-existent at the beginning of the 1980s, but then went though 
phases of emergence, growth, sophistication and international integration over a period of 
approximately 20 years. The process is thus in some sense ‘completed’, rather than still 
ongoing, as in most other Asian countries (except Japan, which, however, is a special case for 
other reasons) or alternative benchmarks. The countries also represent the full spectrum with 
regard to the level of ambition of exchange-rate policy and ‘reputation’: from hard-currency, 
low-interest-rate countries to countries with a near-emerging-market status. We claim that due 
to this diversity, our eleven benchmark countries constitute an excellent ‘laboratory’ with 
regard to the link between money market development and the conduct of monetary policy.    5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide our view upon Chinese 
monetary policy in recent years. Section 3 describes the development of money markets in put 
benchmark countries and put China into that perspective. In Section 4 we address changes in 
central bank operation and the increasing role of open market operations (OMO). Section 5 
extracts the main drivers behind these changes whereas in Section 6 we provide an empirical 
evaluation of the Chinese monetary policy in the light of the European experience. In Section 
7, we discuss the Chinese monetary policy options in the light of the experience of our 
benchmark countries. Finally, Section 8 summarizes our findings in terms of policy 
recommendations for China based on the experience of these countries.  
 
2. Chinese monetary policy in recent years – key pillars of the development  
A brief summary of the People’s Bank of China’s (PBC) recent policies and performance runs 
as follows. After the abolition of the dual exchange rate system in the mid-1990s, a fixed 
exchange rate regime was adopted whereby the RMB was pegged to the USD. Four main 
objectives of macroeconomic policy were attached to the reorientation of policy: economic 
growth, price stability, full employment, and balance of payments equilibrium (Ping and 
Xiaopu, 2003). Current account convertibility was adopted in 1996, and restrictions on capital 
inflows were partially removed, whereas the enforcement by the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) of remaining capital controls was strengthened (Ping and Xiaopu, 
2003). Monetary policy was to some extent designed to support a more general policy to 
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows (for an extensive analysis, see Prasad and Wei, 
2005). In 1998−2001, the PBC made (largely unsuccessful) attempts to increase credit growth 
through open market operations and lowering of minimum reserve requirements. From 2003 
onward, the attempts have rather been to tighten monetary policy, however with equally 
limited effects of the ‘standard’ arsenal of instruments. The PBC has frequently had to resort   6
to moral suasion and various forms of ad hoc administrative measures to steer banks’ 
behavior in the desired direction (BIS, 2005; Green, 2005; PBC, various, Roach, 2004; van 
der Linden, 2005). 
Steps have been taken toward further deregulating capital inflows, relaxing restrictions 
on capital outflows and expanding permissible foreign exchange transactions since the early 
2000s. As a step toward gradually increasing the flexibility of the exchange rate (after 
intensive international debate – see, e.g., Eichengreen, 2005; Goldstein, 2004; Prasad et al., 
2005; Yang et al., 2004), the US dollar peg was abandoned in July, 2005, the RMB revalued 
by 2.1% and henceforth linked to a currency basket through a managed float system. 
There is increasing attention to the poor transmission of monetary policy in China 
(PBC, various; Ping, 2004). The problem is due to deficiencies both in the step between the 
central bank and the banking system, and between the banks and the public. Five such 
deficiencies can be identified: 1) The non-responsiveness of the banking system to the central 
bank’s policy (in particular, their insensitiveness to interest-rate changes) is largely due to the 
excess supply of liquidity. If banks do not have to borrow in the money market to meet their 
liquidity needs, they do not care about the price at which money can be borrowed there. 2) As 
a consequence of banks’ own insensitiveness to the pricing of money, they do not 
appropriately pass on variations in these prices to their customers; hence, central bank policy 
has a very limited effect on the consumption and investment behavior of firms and 
households. 3) Even if interest rate changes are passed on by banks on the margin, the effect 
is diluted, since the banks have limited ability and incentive to adequately price risk and 
differentiate the price of credit to different categories of borrowers accordingly (cf. 
governance problems within the banking sector below). 4) Borrowers are themselves 
insensitive to variations in the cost of funds because they do not face any consequences in the 
event of failure to service the debts (state-owned enterprises), and because credit-driven   7
consumption is still extremely limited (households). 5) The continuing habit of the PBC to 
exert control over the price, quantity, and direction of credit through informal measures 
(‘window guidance’, moral suasion) as a means to achieve policy objectives, and – more 
generally – the remaining political influence overlarge parts of the banking sector, distort the 
market mechanism in the bank loans market, leading to continuing mis-pricing and mis-
allocation of credit. 
 
3. General developments in domestic money markets in Europe as benchmarks 
What political lessons can then be found from the creation of markets in Europe? The 
European benchmark countries this paper all followed the general trend among industrial 
countries of broad-based financial-sector deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s. Below, we 
make a brief summary of that process.
 3 We then go on to describing major trends in financial 
innovation, differentiation, and market growth, with a focus on short-term securities markets 
(money markets). The findings are used for comparisons with the present state of affairs in 
China. 
 
3.1. The point of departure - Stylized fact of the European situation 1980 and China today 
The major types of regulations in force in a majority of European countries until the 1970s or, 
in most cases, the 1980s were pricing regulations (mostly various types of interest-rate 
regulations), a wide variety of quantitative credit and investment regulations, issuing controls 
on financial instruments, market-entry rules and ownership (asset) restrictions. The different 
types of regulation one by one are described below. 
Interest-rate regulations were in force in all countries in the sample except the 
Netherlands at the start of the period covered here. Several countries pursued a low-interest-
rate policy that, in combination with high inflation rates, led to very low (or even negative)   8
real-interest-rate levels. This, in turn, led to a high credit demand, indicating that credit had to 
be rationed and the market as a whole had to be regulated in detail, both as regards prices and 
quantities. 
Quantitative credit and investment restrictions, in one form or another, were employed 
in a majority of our benchmark countries, both as a general monetary-policy instrument, as a 
tool to ration and control the allocation of credit, and to provide cheap financing for the 
government. 
Issuing restrictions on securities were used to control the transfer of credit through 
direct channels (that is, through market issues). Usually, rules and regulations on minimum 
maturities, etc., were combined with various authorization requirements. 
Market-entry rules or line-of-business regulations—the separation of banking and 
securities businesses, the separation of commercial banking from investment or savings 
banking, and other branching restrictions—limited the segmental integration within the 
financial system. A similar effect is implied by regulations limiting ownership linkages 
between different types of financial institutions, between financial institutions and other 
industry sectors, between domestic and foreign institutions, etc. In addition, and with strong 
resemblance with China, a sort of ‘ownership restriction’ was the dominance in some 
benchmark countries of state-owned banks at this period. This applied primarily to the 
countries with previously entirely nationalized financial sectors (Greece and Portugal), but 
also, to some extent and during some periods, in other countries. In Norway, for instance, 
indirect control by the government of the financial sector through ownership of major banks 
was one consequence of the banking crisis around 1990. 
As can be seen from Table 1, which summarizes the situation around 1980 in terms of 
regulation in the benchmark countries, several of them applied all major types of regulations. 
Portugal, for instance, was in 1980 very much still marked by the effects of the nationalization   9
of the financial sector in 1974 and a system whereby the Banco de Portugal was equipped 
with almost limitless authority to intervene in all aspects of financial intermediation. All or 
most regulation types were also used, for instance, in Austria, Greece, Norway and Sweden. 
As can also be seen from the table, the same holds true for China in the mid-2000s. In 
spite of steps toward deregulation, the financial system is still repressed and based on 
regulatory infractions in financial market activity. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
3.2. Deregulation and liberalization of financial sectors 
In this sub-section we describe what happened in our European benchmark countries in terms 
of deregulation and liberalization during the 1980s and 1990s and what is currently happening 
in China.. 
Interest-rate controls began to be dismantled in the late 1970s in Austria, Denmark, 
Ireland, Norway and Sweden. By the mid-1980s, Denmark, Norway and Sweden (beside the 
Netherlands) had completely deregulated interest rates. Nor had Ireland by this time any 
formal interest-rate controls, but (retail) interest rates were loosely controlled through 
informal agreements between banks and the central bank until the mid-1990s. Interest-rate 
liberalization in these benchmark countries was completed with a lag to the very earliest 
deregulators (apart from the Netherlands primarily Germany, Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand), but with a lead to most of continental Europe, where the main steps were taken in 
the second half of the 1980s. 
By 1990, also Austria,
4 Finland and Switzerland had completely liberalized interest 
rates; Belgium had, in principle, also deregulated interest rates, but retained some minor 
controls on specific categories or types of credit. The last among the benchmark countries to   10
abolish interest-rate regulations, Greece and Portugal, completed the process a few years into 
the 1990s, in accordance with their gradual implementation of European-Community 
directives. (See Rautava, 1994; Edey and Hviding, 1995.) 
The general pattern in our benchmark countries was that the liberalization of wholesale 
interest rates occurred first, followed by lending rates and deposit rates. The process was 
mostly gradual, and sometimes hesitant on the part of the authorities. An illustration of this is 
that formal rules and restrictions (a ceiling, a quota, etc.) were often initially followed by 
recommendations or various types of agreements before being de jure liberalized. This was 
the case in Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, as well as other countries 
(Austria and Ireland were mentioned previously). These ‘implicit’ interest rate regulations 
were enforced through the understanding that the authorities could, and would, enforce their 
goals by means of the reinstatement of formal regulations if deemed necessary (see, e.g., 
Grønvik, 1994). 
In China, interbank interest rate ceilings were abolished in 1996, the central bank 
rediscount rate liberalized 2004, and the lending interest rate ceilings for banks were removed 
in 2004. The interest rate liberalization process is still ongoing, however, and administrative 
influence over price-setting is still exerted − both directly (as regards, e.g., deposit rates) and 
implicitly (Green, 2005; Liu, 2005). 
As noted above, there is a clear co-dependence of various types of regulations. Thus, 
quantitative regulations to some extent became obsolete or irrelevant as interest rates were 
being liberalized. By that token, the quantitative regulation of financial intermediation was 
overhauled in Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden in the first 
half of the 1980s. Belgium had begun doing so in 1979, but the process took more or less the 
entire 1980s to be completed. Of the other benchmark countries, Switzerland had not applied   11
quantitative controls since the 1970s. Norway abolished credit regulations in 1988, Portugal 
around 1990, and Greece a few years into the 1990s.  
As regards quantitative regulations in China, credit quotas were formally abolished in 
1998. However, the PBC still routinely controls the quantity of credit on a more discretionary 
basis (see, e.g., BIS, 2005). 
In our benchmark countries, the regulation of debt securities issuance was mostly in 
place for slightly longer than interest-rate and credit controls. Exceptions are Denmark (which 
had a relatively free and internationally oriented bond market based on private debt already in 
the 1970s), and the Netherlands, where regulation was comparatively limited. Switzerland 
was low on formal regulation, but the growth of the domestic market segments was hampered 
by business practice, as well as by tax policy and other factors. Finland, Ireland, Sweden and 
Switzerland lifted issuing controls in the first half of the 1980s. In some countries important 
liberalization measures were implemented in the mid-1980s (for instance in Norway – see 
Norges Bank, Penger & Kreditt, 26:1, 1997). The Netherlands, although comparatively liberal 
in several respects, applied rules on minimum maturities, which constrained the development 
of short-term markets, and were fully abolished only in 1990. 
In other benchmark countries, important steps toward the opening-up of securities 
markets occurred in the context of a reform of government-financing systems. Such is the 
case, for example, in Austria and Belgium (around 1990; see De Broeck et al, 1998), and 
Greece (early/mid-1990s, see Soumelis, 1995). Generally, however, the liberalization of 
markets for private debt was slower than other categories. For instance, the Portuguese fixed-
income market was not formally opened to all domestic issuers until 1994 and to foreign 
issuers 1995 (see de Pinho, 2000). Also, as previously mentioned, market development was in 
some cases stifled by the existence of various types of more or less informal authorization   12
requirements. For instance, Switzerland abolished numerous cartel-like conventions and 
permanent securities-issuance syndicates of banks in 1990. 
In China, securities issuance (both debt and equity) remains surrounded by formal and 
informal restrictions. Before the mid 1980s (the pre-reform period), the resource allocation 
was entirely in the hands of the central government; State Owned Enterprises (SOE) were 
financed over the government fiscal budget. The SOEs had in general no idea about the 
concept of cost of capital. The central government used state-owned commercial as fiscal 
agents. However, some local, unofficial and unregulated markets for equity shares (and 
bonds) began to develop spontaneously in the 1980s (Green, 2003).  By the opening of stock 
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen in December 1990 the Chinese government began to 
pay attention to the regulation and supervision of such markets. However, this attention ended 
up having the government in dual roles: majority owner of the bulk of listed shares and 
regulator at the same time. The government’s characterization of the existing stock exchanges 
as ‘controlled experiments’ is illustratory of the general attitude of the authorities. The reform 
of SOEs was slow and liberalization of the financial sector was delayed as part of a cautious 
and gradualist approach adopted by the Chinese government. The overall goal for 
governments at all levels was social stability.  
Things started to happen by the early 1990s when declining fiscal revenues and bad 
loans limited the government to meet SOEs financing needs. Formal central regulatory 
controls were introduced over the two stock exchanges combined with financial market 
liberalization and state bank reforms. Initially the stock exchanges were supervised by the 
local governments, but in 1992 the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was 
established. A quota system was used to control the flow of initial public offerings (IPO); 
prior to December 1990 based on amount of shares and then based on the number of firms 
listed. The annual quota was set by the State Planning Commission.  Stock market emerged as   13
a vehicle to facilitate the financing of SOEs. The SOEs had some autonomy but the ultimate 
control was delegated to local government.  
A great leap forward towards a market economy in China was taken in 1994/95 with a 
set of measures ranging from the Government subjecting itself to stronger market discipline 
by denying itself the option to borrow from PBC for fiscal purposes, state-owned commercial 
banks’ (SCB) role as agents of the state declined, the formal establishment and regulation of 
the interbank market (IM) for short term loans, exchange rate unification, an interbank foreign 
exchange market, three specialized policy banks; all paving the way for open market 
operations (OMO) by the PBC. The Asia financial crisis made the central government aware 
of the vulnerability of the Chinese financial system.  
In 1998 four state-owned Asset Management Companies (AMC) were established to 
handle the accumulated huge volumes of non-performing loans (NPL). The clean up process 
started in 1999.  This meant the start of a non-bond debt market in China, whereas the trade of 
government bonds on the interbank market was introduced already in August 1997. However, 
corporate bonds (CB) were issued already in the mid-1980s but in an unregulated framework. 
When a formal regulation was introduced in the early 1990s the primary CB market was 
reserved for a few selected SOEs and the market has since then remained small. Government 
bonds have dominated the Chinese debt market. In 2002, trade in government bonds 
amounted to 95% of all traded debt excluding NPLs (Bottelier, 2004).  
The Chinese financial market is still a three-person-game. Central government, local 
government and listed firms are the players with local governments acting like “parents” of 
listed firm. In September 2006, an important piece of the market game emerged in the form of 
the opening of the Financial Futures Exchange. 
 In some of our benchmark countries - including Austria, Belgium, Denmark (where de-
compartmentalization of the banking sector occurred already in 1975), Finland, Norway and   14
Sweden - various market-entry regulations (branching regulations, line-of-business 
restrictions, etc.) were partly or wholly abolished in the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, a 
‘spontaneous’ functional market integration (taking place, for instance, through banks 
establishing subsidiaries within the securities-trading business, or purchasing finance 
companies) is often considered a major feature of the financial-market transformation process 
undergone by the industrial countries in the 1980s.
5 To some extent, this implies a 
diminishing practical importance of remaining regulations. 
To this category may also be counted restrictions on foreign-bank entry. In the sample 
of benchmark countries, Finland, Norway, Portugal and Sweden were among those  that 
opened their domestic markets for foreign banks during the 1980s. In some other countries, 
including the Netherlands and Switzerland, rules on foreign-bank access to the domestic 
market were already relatively liberal at the start of the 1980s, whereas in much of the rest of 
the continental-European benchmark countries, significant steps were taken only with the 
implementation of the EU’s 2
nd Banking Directive (effective in 1993). 
In the area of ownership control, the deregulation wave made a comparatively modest 
impression in the 1980s and 1990s, and several such regulations remained in the mid-1990s 
(see, e.g. Herring and Litan, 1995). State-ownership of a large proportion of domestic 
financial institutions also outlived financial integration in some benchmark countries. The 
Greek banking sector, for instance, was still completely dominated by state-owned banks 
when ownership regulations were abolished. In terms of assets, the government’s ownership 
share was about 75 percent (see Hope, 1993). In other benchmark countries, state-ownership 
of banks was an effect of crises in the banking systems, as noted above. The government’s 
ownership share of banks in Norway and Finland were 52 and 35 percent, respectively, in the 
early 1990s.
6   15
State-owned banks dominate the financial sector also in China. The four state-owned 
banks had a market-share of 57% in 2003. Local banks (20%), 10 joint stock commercial 
banks (14%), three policy banks (8%) and foreign banks (1%) constitute the rest of the 
Chinese banking sector (van der Linden, 2005).  Institutional reforms of PBC and state-owned 
banks have been undertaken since 1993, however, initially largely unsuccessful, because they 
did not fundamentally alter incentive structures and remove soft budget constraints within the 
banking sector (see, e.g., Park and Sehrt, 2001). A five-year time-table for a gradual opening 
of the banking sector was announced in 2001, and reform thereafter has included the transfer 
of power over banking regulation and supervision from the PBC to the China Banking 
Regulation Commission (CBRC), financial restructuring of the largest state-owned banks 
(both through AMC and recapitalization directly over the government budget), and a full 
abolition of line-of-business, ownership and foreign-entry restrictions in the banking sector as 
a result of WTO negotiations (still ongoing; see Hope and Hu, 2006; Liu, 2005). In 2006, we 
have also witnessed the privatization of some of the largest state-owned banks. 
To summarize, the deregulation of domestic financial sectors in the European 
benchmark countries began between the late 1970s (Austria, Scandinavian countries) and the 
mid-1980s (Greece, Ireland), and was completed mostly around 1990, or a few years into the 
1990s. In China, liberalizations began in the mid-1990s. It is difficult to measure the level of 
repression, but based on the categories of restrictions still in de facto use in the mid-2000s, it 
would appear as though the process still has some way to go. 
 
3.3. Money market growth and development 
Table 2 summarizes starting years for some of the main money market segments in the 
European benchmark countries and in China. In the former, during the 1980s and 1990s a 
certain convergence in terms of the presence of different types of money-market instruments   16
occurred. Considerable dissimilarities remained, however, in terms of the relative total size of 
the domestic market as well as in terms of the relative importance of specific segments of the 
market (see Table 3). 
INSERT TABLE 2 
INSERT TABLE 3 
 
The most traditional money-market segment is the interbank deposit market, whose 
importance is largely determined by the monetary authorities’ choice of operative framework 
and by the existence of alternative segments. Deposit markets turned up in most countries as 
monetary-policy instruments changed during the 1980s and 1990s. In China, the CHIBOR 
interbank market was established in 1996 and opened to foreign banks in 1998. 
In the short-term securities markets treasury bills or equivalent short-term government 
securities are typically the most important sub-market. In several benchmark countries (for 
example, Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Sweden), short-term government securities had existed 
for a long time before the 1980s, but were traditionally non-marketable, and sold directly to 
final holders at regulated rates. In none of the benchmark countries did true markets for t-bills 
turn up until after 1980. Years in Table 2 therefore refer to the appearance of viable markets 
for short-term government securities.  
The Chinese t-bill market is so far insignificant. The aggregate supply of tradable bonds 
was in 2003 equivalent of about 32 percent of GDP. A low figure as compared with the 
average for developed markets which is about 100 percent. The maturity structure of bonds is 
such that less than 5% are 2-year or less, indicating a short-term (government) bill market of 
somewhere around 1% of GDP 
Two other main cash-instrument types—commercial paper (CP, generally issued by 
non-bank entities) and certificates of deposit (CD, a securitized bank liability)—were   17
introduced in several benchmark countries in the mid-1980s, but as revealed by Table 3 their 
importance varies greatly. In some cases (for example Finland and Sweden), the introduction 
of CDs preceded the introduction of tradable government securities. In other cases, 
diversification of the market to other than government issues occurred several years after a t-
bill market—in a true market sense—had been established (Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Portugal). A CD market does not exist in China beyond the PBC’s own central bank bills, 
which were introduced in 2003. The development of this segment has been fast, however, 
with an increase of outstanding amounts to an estimated 7% of GDP in March 2005. 
Commercial-paper markets emerged in far from all the benchmark countries. In many 
cases, the markets have also shrunk somewhat from their peaks in the early 1990s. There 
seems to be some indications that where commercial-paper markets could be benchmarked 
against a liquid government-bill market (or other instrument with a market-supporting role), 
their development came earlier and was more extensive (see Alworth and Borio, 1993). In 
China, the PBC announced rules for issuance of ‘short-term financing bills’ in late 2004 but 
no viable market exists by early-2006. 
Beyond the above reported cash instruments, various derivative instruments play an 
important role, as do repurchase agreements (repos), which − according to BIS estimates − 
was the fastest growing instrument/transaction type internationally during the 1990s. Data, 
however, are scarce. Reporting in different countries is also such that available historical data 
are not readily comparable (for a survey of repo markets in G-10 countries, including data 
availability, see Bank for International Settlements, 1999). Existing data indicate considerable 
variations in derivatives as well as repo markets (see Forssbæck & Oxelheim, 2003). In some 
benchmark countries, repo markets were partly stifled due to thin debt markets (the 
Netherlands, Norway), ambiguities with regard to regulatory policies, legal status and tax 
treatment (Ireland, Portugal, Switzerland), or an excessively high degree of concentration of   18
market players (see Commission of the European Communities, 1999). A repo market was 
established in China in the early 1990s; since 1997, it is split up into an interbank market and 
a corporate market (hosted by the Shanghai Stock Exchange). Available evidence indicate that 
repo transactions in government bonds are by far the most important contract type traded 
interbank (PBC, various; Ping, 2005), but it is not clear to what extent these are transactions 
with the central bank; nor is it possible to directly compare the importance of this market with 
other central bank facilities for the settling of liquidity imbalances (see sections 3.2 and 5, 
below). A first set of rules to govern Chinese banks’ derivatives trading was introduced in 
2004, but a viable market does not yet exist (de Teran, 2004). However, as was previously 
mentioned, the establishment of the Financial Futures exchange in September 2006 may mean 
a essential step forward, 
 
4. Changes in central-bank operations
7 
Until the mid-1980s central banks in our benchmark countries relied largely on traditional 
credit and deposit facilities (standing facilities), supported by various direct controls, for the 
conduct of monetary policy. The ordinary credit facilities were mostly supplemented by some 
sort of tranche-division system (for example, Denmark, Finland), penalty-rate system 
(Austria, Sweden), or a combination of both (Belgium, the Netherlands) in order to allow 
central-bank control of the marginal cost of banks’ borrowing under the facilities, and thereby 
of the supply of liquidity to the banking system.  
All our benchmark countries reformed their operative frameworks for monetary policy 
quite substantially during the 20 years we study. In some countries, the revision of the 
monetary-policy operating framework took the form of comprehensive reforms (for example, 
Denmark 1992, Switzerland 2000); in others, developments proceeded in a more piecemeal 
manner. In several countries (Belgium, Finland, the Netherlands) the trend toward a gradually   19
increased diversification of liquidity-supply instruments became visible toward the mid-to-
late 1980s. Others followed suit during the 1990s (Denmark, Portugal, Austria). 
 
4.1. The diminishing role of quantitative controls 
The diversification of instruments used by central banks as well as by other money-market 
agents in our benchmark countries during the 1980s and 1990s was paralleled with the lifting 
of most direct regulations. This sub-section therefore focuses on one direct control that 
remained in use by many central banks—the minimum reserve requirement.  
During the 1990s, practically all our becnhmark countries followed an international 
trend among industrial countries toward lowering or completely abolishing reserve 
requirements (see Table 4). The major arguments behind these reforms were to reduce the tax 
effect of reserve requirements and to neutralize the competitive disadvantage of subjected 
depository institutions vis-à-vis other financial institutions – domestic or foreign (see 
European Commission, ‘Minimum Reserve Requirements and Monetary Policy’, Weekly 
Review of Financial Market Developments 37, November, 1997). 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
The objectives of the reserve-requirement instrument were originally to maintain banks’ 
liquidity even in case of large deposit withdrawals, and to influence liquidity for monetary-
policy purposes. Nowadays, reserve requirements mainly serve three purposes in developed 
economies. One is as a means of providing for banks’ ongoing liquidity needs (having banks 
in a position of reliance on the central bank facilitates the conduct of monetary policy). A 
second purpose is to improve the flexibility of banks’ liquidity management (reserves can be 
used to settle interbank payments). Finally, reserve requirements (particularly if   20
unremunerated) can provide seigniorage income for the central bank, thereby contributing to 
its profitability and (economic) independence (see, e.g. Grønvik, 1994; Bank of Finland 
Bulletin 12, 1996; BIS, 2003). 
Benchmark countries that abandoned the use of reserve requirements more or less 
entirely relatively early on include Belgium (mid-1970s), Norway (1987) and Sweden (1990). 
In Norway, for example, both primary reserves (that is, cash-reserve requirements) and 
secondary reserves (compulsory bond holdings by banks and insurance companies) had been 
used since the 1960s. From 1971 only the primary reserve requirements were used in Norway, 
but they were altered often and by much. 
Minimum reserve requirements did play a role (at least formally) as liquidity-
management instrument until the late 1990s in the Netherlands and, to some extent, in 
Austria, Finland, and Ireland. However, the only benchmark country where they played a 
significant role for active liquidity management in the late 1990s was Greece (until its entry 
into the EMU), where the instrument was deemed necessary to retain control over the 
liquidity supply in the face of large capital inflows. This parallels earlier experiences in, for 
instance, Portugal, other emerging market economies, and the present situation in China, 
where since the 1990s the PBC still relies heavily on reserve requirements to manage 
liquidity.  
China has lowered reserve requirement ratios since the 1980s and 1990s (see Figure 1), 
but there is no clear-cut trend, and an indication of the PBC’s continued reliance on this 
instrument type is its introduction of a differentiated reserve requirement system in 2004 to 
increase flexibility and precision. However, minimum reserve requirements do not bite as a 
monetary policy tool unless a properly functioning pricing mechanism in the money market 
gives banks an incentive not to put their liquidity into reserves (i.e. keep them close to the 
minimum requirement). This is not the case in China, where 1998-2004 the reserve holdings   21
of the banks have more or less consistently been in excess of 5 percent beyond the required 
ratio (see Figure 2). 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
          INSERT FIGURE 2 
 
4.2. The increasing role of market instruments in central-bank operations 
Three main types of market instruments predominate: short-term securities, repurchase 
operations, and swaps. The prevalence in our benchmark countries and in China of these main 
instrument types is examined in the present sub-section. 
Effective open-market operations to some extent presuppose an existing market to 
operate in. Thus, central banks have typically, at some point or another, come to favor the 
creation of markets, and have often stimulated and supported their development. This holds 
for interbank deposit markets as well as for short-term securities markets. 
The absence of an efficient interbank market is bad news for the central bank to the 
extent that banks then may rely on central-bank facilities to gain access to liquidity even when 
other banks are very liquid, creating a situation of excess liquidity in the banking system and 
poorer monetary transmission.
8 For monetary policy to bite, banks’ marginal liquidity needs 
must be settled with the central bank. Hence there is a need for central banks to create 
adequate instruments to drain liquidity and to stimulate the formation of markets for 
alternative short-term assets. Instead, traditionally in our benchmark countries, specific credit 
quotas to individual banks were used to atone for this problem. In the general climate of 
decontrol in the mid-1980s, however, it seems ultimately to have been widely accepted that 
stimulating the emergence of efficient markets was a more constructive path to pursue. 
Examples are the establishment of efficient day-to-day interbank markets in Belgium and   22
Sweden (in both cases around 1985–88), which were more or less anticipated effects of 
changes in the layout of monetary-policy operating procedures (BNB, 1985; Kneeshaw and 
Van den Bergh, 1989). More generally, the emergence of a markka money market was 
stimulated by the Bank of Finland’s decision to leave the forward exchange market to the 
devices of the banks themselves (around 1980).  Parallels exist in, for example, Denmark and 
Portugal (see Danmarks Nationalbank Monetary Review, August 1996; and Pinto, 1996). 
The emergence of short-term securities markets adds a dimension to liquidity 
management for central banks. In practice, cash operations in short-term securities by central 
banks are relatively rare, even where the size of these markets is sufficiently large to make 
such operations feasible (see Borio, 1997; BIS, 2003). One reason is that other types of 
operations are more flexible. Other reasons which have carried some weight in several 
benchmark countries are the wish to avoid potential conflict with other public-policy 
objectives (notably public-debt management, for example in Denmark and Portugal, and tax 
policy), and the wish to avoid circumvention of limits on central-bank lending to the 
government.
9 
To avoid conflicts of interest and to increase the effectiveness of monetary policy, it has 
been relatively common for central banks in the benchmark countries to issue their own 
securities (central-bank CDs) in the primary market in order to absorb liquidity from the 
banking system. In some cases, this has been one of the main strategies of the central bank. 
Countries where the issue of central-bank paper has played an important role during shorter or 
longer periods include Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal among the EMU 
countries, and Denmark and Sweden among non-EMU countries. This is currently the main 
type of market operation in China (see Section 3.3). 
Even in the absence of outright transactions in securities, the existence of a liquid 
securities segment in the money market is often argued to facilitate the central bank’s   23
operations by providing collateral to repurchase agreements and similar collateralized 
transactions. To the extent that it does so, the varying degrees to which short-term securities 
markets have emerged in the benchmark countries imply correspondingly varying possibilities 
for the respective central banks to exploit the flexibility and other advantages of repurchase 
agreements and similar instruments. During the course of the 1990s, repurchase transactions 
were adopted as a main liquidity-management instrument in Denmark (as from 1992), 
Sweden (1994) and Switzerland (1998), in Austria (1995), Finland (mid-1990s), the 
Netherlands (refers to ‘special loans’) and then, from the time of its inception in 1999, in the 
whole Eurosystem (see Table 5). 
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In China, the PBC started cash and repurchase operations in government bonds in 1998. 
Temporary reverse repos in bonds were conducted in 2002 but operations then seized because 
of inadequate supply of bonds. The question here is not so much the original maturities of the 
assets, but the absence of a market at all. Government issues are all that exists in the medium-
to-long-term segments; the short end is dominated by PBC bills, but there is scant demand for 
either, because the pricing mechanism does not work.
10 The general conclusion in terms of the 
PBC’s open market operations is that debt markets in the mid-2000s are too shallow for 
effective buy-sellback or sell-buyback operations. 
Some benchmark countries without liquid short-term markets have relied on foreign-
exchange operations (particularly swaps) for liquidity management. The pre-eminence of 
swaps over spot or regular forward-exchange operations simply reflects the greater 
importance of swaps in the interbank market. Swaps are the major instrument by which banks 
cover their forward foreign-exchange commitments to customers (See Hooyman, 1994).   24
Benchmark countries where FX swaps have played a significant role for liquidity 
management by the central bank and/or by the banking system as a whole include Austria, the 
Netherlands and Denmark. In Switzerland, USD-CHF swaps were the principal market 
operation of the National Bank during the period between the early 1980s and the late 
1990s.
11  
A Chinese foreign exchange swap market was established in 1980 after the first 
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions were removed in 1979, and an interbank foreign 
exchange market introduced in 1994 as the dual exchange rate system was abolished (Yang et 
al., 2004). In the mid-2000s, these markets do not play any substantial role for the central 
bank’s liquidity management with the domestic banking sector (BIS, 2003; Ping, 2005). 
 
5. Changes in central-bank operating procedures: main drivers 
Because financial market regulations were partly designed as monetary policy instruments, 
the deregulation process is in itself sufficient reason for reform of the operational framework 
of central banks: as some policy instruments are taken away, others must replace them. 
Beyond this, the literature and the central banks’ own accounts offer five main reasons for the 
more or less universal reform of central bank operating procedures in industrial countries in 
the 1980s and 1990s (see, e.g., Mehran et al., 1996, and Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2003, for 
elaborations). 
First, monetary-policy instruments were changed in several benchmark countries in 
order to adapt the operational frameworks of the respective monetary authorities to new 
regimes and/or new targets for monetary (and exchange-rate) policy.  
Second, the financial deepening of the benchmark economies occurred more or less 
entirely outside the central banks’ balance sheets, and therefore reduced the share of the 
financial system over which monetary authorities could exert direct control. The result was an   25
increasing need for indirect ways to exercise control over the non-monetary components of 
the money supply (price-oriented as opposed to quantity-oriented instruments). 
A third factor relates both to the expansion and diversification of financial markets 
domestically and to the increasing international integration of financial markets. Greater 
interest-rate flexibility and narrowing differentials between rates of return in different 
currencies gave rise to the need for instruments whereby liquidity (and thereby interest rates) 
could be managed more flexibly in time and in magnitude, and with a greater measure of 
accuracy than that offered by, say, discounting, interest-rate controls, and lending ceilings. 
Fourthly, the increasing importance of expectations in a world of free financial markets 
favored the adoption of instruments better suited for signaling the central bank’s monetary 
policy stance.  
A fifth broad category of reasons relates to the wish more generally (on the part of 
monetary authorities) to stimulate money-market activity and improve monetary-policy 
transmission, and to achieve a clearer separation of monetary policy implementation from 
government-debt management, and from other social-policy goals (favoring certain sectors in 
the economy by granting access to cheap credit, etc.) which were auxiliary reasons for the 
imposition of financial-market regulations. Because financial regulations were often of a 
multiple-purpose variety, and because the central bank was typically responsible for the 
implementation of the regulation policy, the distinction between monetary policy and other 
‘types’ of policy had previously not always been very clear-cut. 
Do these five reasons apply to the Chinese situation today? The simple answer is 
maybe, but not generally. The objectives of monetary policy remain manifold and not 
necessarily compatible, and the priorities between different goals are unclear − in other words, 
no major regime shift has taken place; the financial system − as we have seen − is still 
underdeveloped, and financial intermediation beyond the explicit or implicit control of the   26
central bank is limited; as a result of the former, and due to the remaining financial repression, 
the role of expectations is still limited. Reasons three and five, however, deserve closer 
attention in the Chinese case. There is a need for more flexible and accurate instruments, and 
it is a declared objective of the PBC to stimulate money market activity and improve 
monetary policy transmission. The reason is − simply, and in parallel with several of the 
benchmark countries − that monetary policy presently is ineffective (see Ping, 2005, among 
others). The reason it does not work, however, is not obviously the same. In the next session, 
we analyze sources of fluctuations in the liquidity of the Chinese banking system and the 
effects of Chinese monetary policy against the backdrop of the experience of our benchmark 
countries. 
 
6. The bite of Open Market Operations (OMO) in China in an international context 
In order to analyze the bite of Chinese OMOs we construct the following stylized balance 




BR CIC ONA NLB NLG NFA + = + + + ,       (1) 
 
where NFA = net foreign assets; NLG = net lending to the government; NLB = net lending to 
banks; ONA = other net assets; CIC = currency in circulation; and BR = bank reserves. 
The sum of the components on each side of the equality is the monetary base. 
Differencing gives the possibility to analyze the contributions of the various components to 
net changes in the liquidity of the banking system. The changes in the components are scaled 
by the average size of the monetary base over each sample period (in the case of the moving 
                                                 
1 The framework for analysis is due to Borio (1997); for a more detailed analysis of the balance sheet of the 
benchmark central banks, see Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2003).   27
average time series for China in Figures 3 and 4, over the 12 preceding months), in order to 
allow for comparisons over time and across countries. 













j t i t i t BR CIC
T
CIC ONA NLG NFA ALP ,   (2) 
 
where T is the number of observations in each sample period (the number of observations 
over which the scaling factor is averaged), and i can be zero, positive, or negative, depending 
on the temporal relationship between a particular observation and the scaling factor. 
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NLB NPP .       (3) 
 
The sum of the contribution of the autonomous factors and the policy position constitutes net 












j t i t i t BR CIC
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BR NLP .       (4) 
 
The policy position, finally, can then be broken down into its various components (such as 
standing facilities, various types of open market operations, etc.) depending on the degree of 
detail provided by the respective central bank’s balance sheets. When it comes to the PBC, 
this degree is not very high, and it basically just separates between claims on (different types 
of) financial institutions on the asset side and debt securities issuance on the liabilities side.   28
For some of the European countries’ central banks, OMOs in the form of foreign exchange 
operations were not identifiable. The distinction between standing facilities and OMOs is 
therefore not entirely watertight in our sample, and it is even likely that the OMOs component 
is somewhat underestimated as a general rule. 
  Table 6 provides a summary, where the autonomous and policy positions and their 
various components are averaged over the relevant time periods.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
  Figures 3—5 give a more detailed picture of the Chinese case. Figure 3, first, shows that 
net liquidity follows the autonomous determinants of liquidity infusion closely, whereas 
policy generally works in the opposite direction. Both the autonomous position and the policy 
position became markedly larger as of the beginning of 2003, still resulting in a rather sharp 
increase in net liquidity. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 
 
  Of the autonomous factors (Figure 4), changes in cash and in net lending to the 
government appear relatively stationary, whereas the net foreign assets contribution describes 
a clear and rather sharp upward trend. The by far most volatile contribution, however (in 
contrast to the benchmark countries), is that of changes in other net assets. The hike in this 
series after the end of 2003 is wholly due to a relatively large increase in the balance sheet 
item ‘other assets’ between November and December 2003, and – particularly – to the 
disappearance from the liabilities side of all ‘savings deposits of non-financial institutions’   29
between December 2003 and January 2004. No explanation is offered in the PBC’s quarterly 
monetary policy reports for the relevant time period(s), so the interpretation remains open. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
  Figure 5 (A and B), finally, illustrates an attempt to trace the development over time in 
the use of different types of monetary policy instruments. In the figure the solid lines show the 
variability (measured as 12-month rolling standard deviations) over four years (2001—2004) 
of the PBC’s policy position due, respectively, to standing facilities (panel A) and open 
market operations (panel B). As a comparison the figure also reproduces the average 
corresponding variabilities for the included benchmark countries at three points/periods in 
time (cf. Table 6, rows 8 and 9). A ‘corridor’ of the cross-country variation in these 
variabilities is also added.  We can see that the trend-wise development over time for the 
benchmark countries clearly shows the gradual demise of standing facilities and 
corresponding rise of OMOs as main policy instrument over the 20-odd year period. The 
considerably shorter time for which the Chinese development is studied shows no similar 
clear trend. Instead, the variability in the policy position of the PBC is comparatively low and 
stable, and at the lower standard deviation bound as compared to the benchmark countries. A 
tentative conclusion would be that OMOs in China are not yet very extensive in international 
comparison, possibly reflecting the relatively underdeveloped state of financial markets in 
general and money markets in particular. A further conclusion of the overall analysis – one 
that would tend to support previous analyses (e.g., Green, 2005; Ping, 2004) – would be that 
the policy actions of the PBC in general are comparatively small and ineffectual relative to the 
effects of autonomous determinants of liquidity and to the overall size of the monetary base. 
Any conclusion, however, about the form and relative importance of the PBC’s various   30
operations has to be delivered with the caveat of what was mentioned above, viz. that the 
separation between different kinds of operations in the PBC’s balance sheets is not very 
transparent. A more general remark about the direction and speed of the development is that 
in the perspective of a 20-year development in Europe, it is of course not surprising that China 
still has some way to go. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
 
7. Effectiveness of monetary policy operations - discussion 
In this section we present some conclusions regarding the effectiveness of monetary policy 
operations during the financial transition period of our benchmark countries and discuss the 
relevance of these in terms of Chinese monetary policy options. First, autonomous factors are 
often the most important sources of liquidity fluctuations in the domestic money market. The 
central bank is frequently ‘unsuccessful’ in offsetting these influences other than imperfectly. 
In short, this means that the job of the central bank is primarily to forecast and offset factors 
outside its direct control that influence the domestic market, and only then (marginally) to 
‘steer’ the money market.
12 The two most important autonomous sources of fluctuation in 
money-market liquidity (and thus the major factors that the central banks have to counter in 
their policies) are net foreign assets and net lending to the government. The net-foreign-assets 
portion of the autonomous position should—all else equal—be more variable in countries 
with far-reaching exchange-rate commitments, where the central bank has been active in the 
foreign-exchange market or in other ways made more extensive use of foreign-exchange 
reserves to uphold that commitment. However, Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2003) instead find 
that net foreign assets are a more important source of liquidity fluctuation in ‘weak-currency’   31
countries (regardless of exchange-rate regime), and a less important one in ‘hard-currency’ 
countries. 
  This leads up to the second main conclusion: non-credible policy (for example exchange 
rate) commitments lead to ineffective central bank operations. If the central bank’s target 
variables are influenced to a great extent by factors beyond its control, then not only is the 
effectiveness in achieving the desired policy goals impeded, but so also is its choice among 
the range of instruments at its disposal, as well as its capacity to influence the overall structure 
of the money market.  
Thus, thirdly, autonomous factors affect central bank instruments and money market 
structure. On a more general level, this emphasizes the need for consistency in the policy 
pursued. 
The consistency issue links the third conclusion to the fourth one. Economic 
independence of central banks leads to more effective central bank operations and vice versa. 
If economic independence of the central bank can be approximated by the influence on 
liquidity fluctuations over the central bank’s balance sheet of net lending to the government, 
then the central bank’s ability to effectively anchor money market interest rates and to 
stabilize the exchange rate, is increasingly impeded the more it has to counter liquidity 
fluctuations resulting from the obligation to fulfill other public-policy goals (such as 
government financing). 
Below, we use these four conclusions in order to structure a discussion about the roots 
of the present ineffectiveness of Chinese monetary policy. 
  Based on conclusion 1 above: Large capital inflows and resulting build-up of foreign 
exchange reserves has been the most important source of liquidity in the early 2000s. Base 
money growth has trend wise increased from 2% to 17% between 1998 and 2003 (Goldstein, 
2004). Foreign exchange reserves as percent of GDP has increased from 15% the first quarter   32
2001 to 40% at the end of 2004 (Goldstein, 2004). The PBC’s operations during the last few 
years have largely been geared toward offsetting these undesired money-supply effects of 
capital inflows. 
  Estimations by Green (2005) show that the PBC’s open market operations are almost 
perfectly correlated with capital inflows. Yet, Green reports that the operations are able to 
sterilize less than 50% of the effect of these inflows on the money supply. According to the 
estimates, between the middle of 2004 and early 2005, foreign exchange inflows added 
cumulatively to the money base in the order of RMB 100 bn per month, indicating an annual 
growth rate of around 70%. The asymmetry of capital controls giving a bias toward net capital 
inflows has exacerbated this problem. 
  Based on conclusions 2 and 4 above: The multiple, and often incompatible, goals of 
monetary policy − fixed dollar exchange rate, inflation, growth, employment, financial 
stability, etc. − are evidently a major problem for Chinese monetary policy. The very recent 
problems of the PBC to make monetary policy ‘bite’ are clearly influenced by the exchange 
rate regime, for example. Given the level of financial risk in the economy, the possibility of 
misleading interest rate levels, and other factors, it is not obvious that the currency is/was 
under-valued (for discussions, see, e.g., Eichengreen, 2005; Goldstein, 2004; Prasad et al., 
2005); whether it was or not, however, it would appear as though a revaluation came to be 
expected for at least two years before the modest revaluation was finally implemented in July 
2005. This partially explains the troubles of the PBC of conducting a monetary policy which 
was much too expansionary for domestic conditions, but still not expansionary enough to 
keep capital inflows at bay (the share of non-foreign direct investment inflows also 
significantly increased during this period; see BIS, 2003, 2005; Prasad and Wei, 2005; van der 
Linden, 2005). In short, the exchange rate goal was non-credible, which worsened the 
conditions for monetary policy operations. More generally, an exchange rate stability goal   33
increasingly undermines monetary policy autonomy as capital controls erode, which – by 
definition – compromises some or several of the other goals. The internal deregulation of the 
financial sector and the full market access of foreign banks (implying the possibility of 
interest arbitrage between foreign and the domestic Chinese markets) will further erode the 
remaining restrictions on the capital account (Liu, 2005). 
  Not just non-credible exchange rate goals disturb monetary policy; another example 
may be the attempts to simultaneously achieve the goals to safeguard financial stability and 
prop up employment in the publically owned manufacturing sector. Large state-owned 
enterprises are squeezed by remaining commitment to production planning, and are unable to 
compete with the private sector. State-owned banks are forced to finance state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) with successively new loans (which are frequently not repaid), in order to 
avoid large-scale unemployment and social unrest. Remaining political influence over the 
banking sector, lack of incentives for adequate credit assessment and monitoring (because of 
the seemingly unlimited willingness of the government to bail out banks) and lack of legal 
enforcement of financial contracts, as well as general property-rights and transparency issues, 
lead to massive mis-allocation of savings (2/3 of savings are channeled to the public sector 
through the banking system) and to the accumulation of non-performing assets on banks’ 
balance sheets (estimates of non-performing loans range from 20 to 50% of the largest banks’ 
total loan portfolios, or 30 to 80 % of GDP; see van der Linden, 2005). 
  Based on conclusion 3 above: At least two more reasons for excess liquidity in the 
Chinese banking system exist. First, the financial system in general is underdeveloped and 
unable to absorb the large monetary overhang in the economy; i.e., there is a lack of 
alternative investments, especially for short-term funds (see money market structure, above). 
Second, there exist de facto lending restrictions. There is much to suggest that more or less 
official administrative control of the quantity and direction of banks’ lending is currently the   34
most important instrument at the PBC’s disposal to contain money supply growth. At the 
same time, these practices are counter-productive to the longer-term interests of the PBC to 
improve the transmission mechanism to the extent that they leave banks awash with liquidity. 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
Up to the late 1970s and early 1980s, money markets (as well as the financial sectors in 
general) in our benchmark countries were typically underdeveloped and highly regulated. 
Since then, politics – through financial sector deregulation, government debt policy, and de-
politicization of monetary policy – has been one of the main determinants of money-market 
development.  
We argue that financial deregulation as an ‘active’ or ‘passive’ response of politicians to 
developments beyond their control, the need to find new and more flexible sources of 
government borrowing, and the need to establish a forum for effective monetary-policy 
implementation—go a long way to explain the significant cross-country differences among 
our benchmark countries in terms of money-market size and structure, as well as the timing 
and direction of various policy decisions and outcomes. A main observation is also that a 
policy decision, once taken, cannot easily be reversed, as the development over time may be 
characterized as a continuous interplay between policy decisions and market outcomes. The 
development process thus becomes highly path dependent, and largely reflects political ad-
hoc decisions, which are often, in themselves, responses to market developments. There are 
also considerable potential spill-over effects from other policy areas. Therefore, a gradualist 
approach and ‘controlled’ financial deregulation like in China is difficult, because − from the 
point of view of the policy purpose − financial market regulations are complementary (doing 
away with one undermines the purpose of another), and − more generally − ‘controlled’ and 
‘deregulated’ are in some sense mutually exclusive.   35
Chinese monetary policy is largely characterized by this type of spillover effects, and is 
full of inherent inconsistencies and conflicts of interest, giving rise to a large degree of 
discretionary, ad hoc policy measures. As a consequence, China will only be able to partially 
emulate other countries’ experiences, but outcomes will reflect exogenous factors affecting its 
policy and policy responses to those factors, if anything is to be learned from the benchmark 
countries we study here, where central banks have often had a decisive influence on money-
market development. 
Some benchmark countries have changed the basic monetary-policy regime one or more 
times during the period studied (Finland, Greece, Portugal and Sweden are the most obvious 
examples, excepting the changeover to EMU). Changes in monetary-policy conditions and 
operations are correspondingly big in these countries. Among the benchmark countries that 
essentially stuck to the same policy regime (exchange-rate targets, mostly) throughout the 
1980–1998 period, some saw less dramatic changes in the indicators used to analyze 
monetary policy (Austria, Belgium), while in others, the changes were of average magnitude 
(Netherlands) or comparatively big (Denmark). 
Did in our benchmark countries comparatively radical structural changes in the 
domestic money market (in terms of innovation, market growth and regulatory changes) 
correspond also to bigger changes in monetary policy? There seems to be some connection 
between, for instance, the size of short-term securities markets and the magnitude of change 
in monetary-policy operations: the limited market growth in Austria and Switzerland, for 
instance, goes together with small changes in central-bank operations; equally, the larger 
markets of Finland and Sweden fit with more and/or bigger changes in the operative aspects 
of monetary policy. On the other hand, the limited size of the short-term securities market in 
the Netherlands, for instance, does not seem to preclude significant changes in policy 
procedures. It must also be added that the gradually increased reliance on the part of central   36
banks on indirect, market-based instruments for policy making is more or less a universal 
phenomenon. Moreover, and as already stressed, the development of markets in which to 
conduct open-market operations has in many cases been explicitly or implicitly supported by 
monetary authorities. 
  A few lessons (or policy recommendations) for China from the transition period of our 
benchmark countries directly related to the money market could be the following.  
•  A general recommendation and a clear lesson from the European experience is to 
focus objectives as well as operative targets of monetary policy. 
•  One part of this increased focus could be increased flexibility of the exchange rate: As 
explained above, whether the RMB is under-valued or not, the rigid exchange rate (the 
de facto effects of the modest revaluation and move to a ‘managed float’ in July 2005 
remain to be seen) has undermined attempts so far to foment broader and deeper 
financial markets, not least a functioning money market, and is directly counter-
productive to the effectiveness of the PBC’s market operations. With the so-far rigid 
currency regime, the absence of adjustment to capital movements on the exchange rate 
effectively implies that adjustments are being ‘passed on’ to a domestic financial 
system which is not developed enough to handle it. A more flexible exchange rate 
would also stimulate the development of the foreign-exchange market, including a 
market for FX derivatives linked to the domestic money market. 
•  The banks’ continued lack of de facto independence as economic entities is distorting 
the financial intermediation process as well as the PBC’s own capacity for effectively 
implementing policy. For market operations to work, there must be a market of 
independent market participants acting on the basis of market criteria – i.e., the PBC 
must not be able to use its political clout to force the banks to respond to various 
measures when in fact they have no economic incentive to do so. The privatization of   37
the state-owned banks may work in the right direction to the extent the Government 
just retain a small stake in the banks and by that reduces its influence.  
•  Creation of short-to-medium term securities market based on bank liabilities, such as a 
CD market; this could help banks clean up their balance sheets (instead of piling up 
liquidity or channeling it into speculative fixed investments), as well as providing 
alternative investments to drain the money market of excess liquidity. 
•  Create a viable treasury bill (short-term government debt) market; with the present 
continued weakness of the banking system, it is unlikely that a CD market could 
function as a benchmark segment for the short end of the debt market. 
It should be noted that many of these solutions rely on more broad-based institutional reforms 
to work properly. China is still largely a ‘commando economy’, which − whether that 
command is explicitly or implicitly exerted − eliminates the proper incentives to reach market 
clearing outcomes in whatever market. Imbalances will persist without a firmer and more 
unconditional commitment to market principles.   38
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Table 1. Financial-market regulation in China 2005 and in the European benchmark 
countries 1980  

















 c •  • 
Austria •  • • • • • 
Belgium •  • –
  • • • 
Denmark •  •
e  •
b –   • – 
Finland •  •
b  – – • • 
Greece •  • • • • • 
Ireland •  •  •  n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Netherlands –  • • – • •
d 
Norway •  • • • • • 
Portugal •  • • • • • 
Sweden •  • –    • • • 
Switzerland  • – – – • • 
n.a.: Information not available. 
Notes: 
a Quotas or ceilings imposed on individual banks or groups of banks/financial institutions, and similar 
detailed credit controls. 
b Quotas have formally been scrapped but the central bank exerts/exterted discretionary 
control of credit growth through ‘guidelines’ or ‘moral suasion’. 
c State-owned commercial banks were relieved 
from directed credit in 1994 by the creation of three so-called ‘policy banks’; the latter, and possibly the former 
as well, remain subject to this type of regulation. 
d No real restrictions, but a separation in a legal sense of 
different types of credit institution was made, and the rules on prudential supervision varied accordingly. 
e 
Abolished in 1980.  
Sources: Edey and Hviding (1995); OECD Financial Market Trends (various); Hope and Hu (2006); Oxelheim 
(1990, 1996); Ping and Xiaopu (2003); Vihriälä (1997); Wyplosz (2001); PBC (2005) and other various national 
sources.   48 
Table 2. Money-market innovations, money-market development in different benchmark countries 
Year of introduction or year of deregulation of market; for some instruments, the indication refers to the year of establishment of a viable market 
in that instrument. 






















repos adopted by 
central bank 
China 1996/1996  1981  (1986)
 b 2004
c/2003 2004
 c  . .  . .  1980  c. 1991/1998
d 
Austria n.a.  /1989  1987
e  . . /1995  . .  1993  1994  C. 1990  . . /1995
f 
Belgium 1988/1988 1990
g 1992/  .  . 1990  1988  1991  1980s n.a./n.a.
h 
Denmark 1970s
i/1988  1975  . ./1992  . .  1988  1988  1970s  1993/1992 
Finland  1986/1987 1991 1982/1987 1986  1992  1988  1980s  .  .  /1991 
Greece  n.a./1994  1985  . . / . .  . . 
j j j  C. 1995/1997 
Ireland 1978/ 1993  1960s
k  n.a./ . .  1989  1989  1989  C. 1990  1997/1997 
Netherlands n.a./1986  1970s  1986/1994  1986  1987  1994
l 1976  n.a./n.a. 
Norway 1993/1993




p 1993/1994  1994 1996 1993 1987  n.a./c.  1992 
Sweden  1985/1987 1982 1980/1992 1983  1984  1985  n.a. 1980s/1984 
Switzerland n.a./n.a.  1981  . ./. .  . .  1990  1994
l 1970s
q 1998/1998 
. .   Not applicable / a viable market in the instrument does not exist. 
n.a.: Data not available. 
Notes: 
a Refers to ‘interbank swaps’: central banks have been using swaplike instruments for considerably longer—the German Bundesbank, e.g., since 1958 (Hooyman, 
1994). 
b Limited trading first permitted in 1986. 
c Refers to ‘short-term financing bills’.
 d Operations have since largely seized due to inadequate supply of underlying 
instruments.
e Refers to the year from which government debt is issued by competitive bidding. 
f The OeNB started to make advances against securities in 1985, but began to 
make systematic use of repos only in 1995. 
g Refers to the year from which treasury certificates are issued by competitive bidding. 
h The BNB has been conducting advances 
against collateral for a long time. 
i The market remained inactive until the reform of the monetary-policy operating framework in 1992. 
j A limited derivatives market exists 
since 1994. 
k Exchequer bills. 
l Options. 
m Refers to the domestic reference rate NIDR; an ‘international’ reference rate (NIBOR) also exists. 
n Norges Bank conducted 
‘temporary bond purchases’ between 1984 and 1986. 
o Refers to the year of liberalization of the interbank market. 
p Treasury bills; so-called ‘negotiable cash bonds’ were 
introduced in 1983. 
q The SNB has been using swaps for monetary-policy-making purposes for a longer time.  
Sources: Alworth and Borio (1993); BIS (1999); Batten et al. (1990); De Broeck et al. (1998); de Teran (2004); Euromoney country surveys (various); Green (2005); Holbik 
(1991); Hope and Hu (2006); Khoury (1990); Kullberg (1991); Norges Bank (1995); OECD Financial Market Trends (various); Oxelheim (1996); Ping and Xiaopu (2003); 
Pinto (1996); Yang et al. (2004); various national sources.  49
Table 3. Short-term securities markets in benchmark countries 1985 and 1995 and in 
China 2004. 
Outstanding amounts (% of GDP at year-end) 
 1985  1995 









AT 3.7      3.7  4.7      4.7 
BE 24.0      24.0  17.8 1.9    2.3 22.0 
DK 4.7  3.9    8.6  15.9 3.3      19.2 
FI       0  6.9 12.9 4.9  1.1 25.8 
GR 24.3      24.3  31.1      31.3 
IE 1.5
a 2.1
b    3.6  2.3
 a 4.9
 b   3.6  10.8 
NL 4.0      4.0  2.0 0.7 1.7 0.5 4.9 
NO 1.6  0.1  1.1  2.8  4.4 1.9    4.1  10.4 
PT 0.8        0.8  8.9 0.2    2.3  11.4 
SE 11.5  1.2     12.7  12.2  0.5 4.6 8.2  25.5 
CH      0  4.0      4.0 
Avg 
(sd) 
     7.7 
(9.0) 
     1 5 . 5  
(9.7) 
  2 0 0 4        
CN 
(est.) 
< 1.0    6.7  n.a.  7 −  8        
n.a.: Data not available. 
Notes: 
a Exchequer bills. 
b Saving certificates. 
Sources: Austrian Federal Ministry of Finance (BMF) and Austrian Federal Financing Agency (BFA); Ministère 
des Finances Belge, Administration de la Trésorerie; Danmarks Nationalbank; Suomen Pankki; Bank of Greece; 
Central Bank of Ireland; De Nederlandsche Bank; Norges Bank; Banco de Portugal; Sveriges Riksbank; Banque 
Nationale Suisse; People’s Bank of China; BIS, Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial Market 
Developments (various); Green (2005); GDP figures from IMF International Financial Statistics and Deutsche 
Bank. 
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Table 4. Reserve requirements in benchmark countries 1970, 1980 and 1990 and in 
China 1990 and 2004 
Late 1990s  2004   
RRIF Max. Diff. RRIF Max. Diff. 
China  •  13.0  −  •  7.5  • 
1970s Late  1980s
a  Late 1990s
b   
RRIF Max. RRIF Max. Diff. RRIF Max. Diff. 
Austria  •  10.5
c  •  9.0
d  •  •  5.0  • 
Belgium  •  6.2
 e  – – – – – – 
Denmark  •
j  3.0  – – – – – – 
Finland  •  3.2
f  •  7.8 –  •  2.0  • 
Greece  •  n.a.  •  n.a. n.a.  •  12.0 – 
Ireland  •  13.0
f  •  10.0
g –  •  3.0 – 
Netherlands  •  7.0
h  •  var.  •  •  var.  • 
Norway  •  5.5
l  – – – – – – 
Portugal  •  15.0
e  •  17.0
i –  •  2.0 – 
Sweden  •  5.0
e  •  4.0 –  –
k –  – 
Switzerland  •  n.a.  •  2.5  •  •  2.5 – 
Eurosystem
m  . .  . .  . .  . .  . .  •  2.0 – 
RRIF: Reserve requirements in force 
•     Yes 
–     No 
Max.: Maximum reserve ratio applied 
Diff.: Different ratios for different types of liabilities/deposits (this information was unavailable for a majority of 
countries for the 1970s; therefore the column has been left out for that decade). 
. .      Not applicable 
N.a.  Not available 
Notes: 
a 1988 unless otherwise indicated; 
b Individual country ratios of EMU countries refer to ratios applied 








j Temporarily in force 
1975–76; 
k The required reserve ratio was set to zero in April 1994, and has not been used as a policy instrument 
since; 
l 1976; 
m since 1999. 
Sources: Bank of Japan (1995); BIS (1997b); Borio (1997); Central-bank bulletins (various); ECB (1998); 
Holbik (1973); Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989); OECD Financial Market Trends (various); Pinto (1996) 
and PBC (2005). 
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Table 5. Targets and main open-market operations in benchmark countries before the 
launch of EMU and in China 2005 






























Government bonds  Issuance of central 
bank bills 



































sales of central-bank 
CDs; foreign-
exchange operations 
Greece Inflation  / 
exchange rate 
M3/M4N 












Ireland Inflation  / 
exchange rate 










Sales of short-term 
paper; foreign-
exchange swaps; etc. 







Portugal Inflation  / 
exchange rate 















Giro deposits  Foreign-
exchange 
swaps 





a Notes issued by the Asset Management Company Arsenal. 
b Private securities introduced in May, 1998, 
as a step in preparation for stage 3 of EMU. 
c Títulos de Invervenção Monetária (Monetary Intervention Bills). 
Sources: Banco de Portugal, Economic Bulletin 1 and 2 1998, and Annual Report 1998; Bank of Finland 
Bulletin 9/1998; Bank of Greece, Monetary Policy Interim Report November 1998 and March 1999, and Annual 
Report 1998; Borio (1997); Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Report 1998; Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary 
Review 2, 1999; Norges Bank, Penger & Kreditt 1998/4, and Annual Reports 1997 and 1998; BIS (2003); PBC, 
China Monetary Policy Report (various quarters 2002-2005); Ping (2004); Ping and Xiaopu (2003).  52
Table 6. Sources of liquidity fluctuations, summary  
(average positions over the respective time periods
a as percentage of the monetary base; 
variability of positions shown as standard deviations in parentheses; for the benchmark 
countries, the variability in the positions is shown as the average of country-by-country 
standard deviations). 
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3. Net liquidity 













    






































      
Breakdown of 
policy position 





















Note: a) The following periods apply: 
China: Jan. 2000 – Dec. 2004 (monthly data). 
7 benchmark countries, early 1980s: Belgium, Jan. 7, 1980–June 30, 1980 (weekly data); Denmark, Jan. 1979–
Dec. 1980 (monthly data); Finland, Jan. 8, 1980–May 30, 1980 (weekly data); Ireland, Dec. 1979–Feb. 1981 
(monthly data); Netherlands, Jan. 5, 1981–May 25, 1981 (weekly data); Portugal, Jan. 1980–Dec. 1981 (monthly 
data); Sweden, Jan. 1980–Oct. 1981 (monthly data). 
8 benchmark countries, late 1980s: Austria, Oct. 31, 1989–Jan. 31, 1990 (weekly data); Belgium, Jan. 2, 1989–
June 26, 1989 (weekly data); Denmark, Jan. 1988–Dec. 1989 (monthly data); Finland, Jan. 6, 1989–May 31, 
1989 (weekly data); Ireland, Dec. 1988– Jun. 1990 (monthly data); Netherlands, Oct. 2, 1989–Feb. 26, 1990 
(weekly data); Norway, Portugal, Jan. 1988—Dec. 1989 (monthly data); Sweden, Jan. 1987—Oct. 1988 
(monthly data). 
10 benchmark countries, late 1990s: Austria, Jan. 7, 1998–May 31, 1998 (weekly data); Belgium, Jan. 5, 1998–
May 29, 1998 (weekly data); Denmark, Dec. 1997—Nov. 1998 (monthly data); Finland, Dec. 31, 1997–May 29, 
1998 (weekly data); Ireland, Dec. 1997—Dec. 1998 (monthly data); Netherlands, week 1, 1998–week 25, 1998 
(weekly data); Norway, Dec. 1997—Dec. 1998 (monthly data); Portugal, Jul. 1996—Jun. 1998 (monthly data); 
Sweden, Dec. 31, 1998–May 31, 1999 (weekly data); Switzerland, Sept. 30, 1999–Apr. 10, 1999 (weekly data). 
 
Sources: The figures are calculated on the basis of data from the respective central banks’ balance sheets, mostly 
taken from annual and/or interim reports; in some cases obtained as spreadsheet documents directly from the 
central bank. 
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Source: People’s Bank of China. 
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Figure 2. Excess reserve ratio of Chinese banks, 1998—2005  
(average at year-end) 
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Source: People’s Bank of China.   55
Figure 3. Autonomous position, policy position, and net liquidity provision in China  
















Source: calculations based on data from the People’s Bank of China.   56
Figure 4: Contributions to autonomous liquidity position in China  
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Source: calculations based on data from the People’s Bank of China. 
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Figure 5: Variability of policy position in China and the benchmark countries 
China (12 month rolling standard deviations, 2001—2004, upper x-axis) and benchmark 
countries (3 time periods between early 1980s and late 1990s, lower x-axis) 
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China, 12M rolling variability
(upper x-axis)
Poly. (Eur. countries, mean
variability (lower x-axis;
smaller dotted lines
represent upper and lower
standard deviations))
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Sources: See Table 6   59
Notes 
                                                 
1 Existing cross-country comparisons of monetary policy operating procedures − e.g., Kneeshaw and Van den 
Bergh (1989), Batten et al. (1990), Bernanke and Mishkin (1992), Kasman (1992), Goodhart and Viñals (1994), 
Hooyman (1994), Bisignano (1996), Borio (1997), BIS (2001), Kopcke (2002), Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2006) 
− consistently indicate that changes in central banks’ operative frameworks are causes as well as effects of 
changes in the functioning and structure of the financial system. 
2 The benchmark  countries are the following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, the Netherlands Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. 
3 For a more comprehensive account of the process of financial deregulation in the Nordic countries, see 
Oxelheim (1996); a survey of this process for a large number of countries, including many emerging-market 
countries, is provided in Williamson and Mahar (1998); beyond these, the best sources for specifics on 
deregulation in particular countries are usually publications from the central bank of the country in question. 
OECD’s Financial Market Trends is also a useful source. 
4 Retail interest rates were controlled in practice in Austria at least until the mid-1990s via gentlemen’s 
agreements between banks; credit has also traditionally been heavily subsidized: in the early 1990s almost half 
of all credit extended to industry, though formally free from regulations, was subsidized (see Pech, 1994). 
5 See, for example, the survey in OECD (1989). It can be noted that the pendulum with regard to branching 
restrictions and market-entry regulation currently tends to swing back somewhat toward increasing regulation, 
the establishment of firewalls between different types of business within multiple-business financial institutions, 
etc. This might be interpreted as an expression of a requirement of minimum regulation to avoid moral hazard 
and/or adverse-selection problems and to ensure public confidence in the financial system. 
6 Banker (1993). Also see the Economist (1992) and Warner (1993) for short background articles on the 
deregulation and privatization of Portuguese banks. 
7 General references for this sub-section not cited elsewhere include BIS (1986, 1997a), and Aspetsberger 
(1996). 
8 In Switzerland, for instance, the underdeveloped domestic money market, the unaccommodative attitude of the 
National Bank with regard to reserve imbalances (resulting from its long-standing reserves target—now 
abolished—) and the comparatively high cost of Lombard (overdraft) facilities led Swiss banks to hold reserves 
substantially in excess of those required under reserve requirements (Kasman, 1992).   60
                                                                                                                                                          
9 These problems are particularly relevant in emerging stages of money-market development; see, e.g., Mehran 
et al. (1996); Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1989). 
10 As an illustration, Green (2005) reports that the mispricing by the market of a long-term government bond 
issue made underwriters unable to resell the bonds without incurring major losses, forcing the PBC to step in and 
buy a large portion of the issue − effectively amounting to central bank financing of the government. 
11 By 1987, the National Bank’s holdings of currency swap contracts amounted to approx. half of its foreign-
currency assets, which in turn amounted (together with gold) to almost 90% of its total assets. Roughly that 
situation remained until 1998, when the National Bank began to broaden its arsenal of instruments (Banque 
Nationale Suisse, Bulletin Trimestriel 4, December, 1999). Also see Zurlinden (1996). 
12 One potentially complicating factor here is that if we believe that the central bank’s policy measures can in 
and of themselves give rise to ‘innovations’, we have an endogeneity problem of the ‘exogenous’ factors: the 
central bank influences these factors indirectly through its own actions. 